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VIRTUAL ADOPTION AND RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE
Since adoption is entirely statutory,' equity courts in many juris-
dictions have developed the doctrine of virtual adoption to cover
certain situations where, for some reason, the statutory procedures
have not been completed so as to result in a legal adoption.2 Under
this doctrine mere foster children are granted such rights of inheri-
tance from their foster parents as they would have enjoyed had they
been legally adopted. A few cases have raised an additional question
concerning virtual adoption.3 That is, whether the heirs of the foster
parents can use an adoption as a basis for a right to inherit from the
foster child when he dies intestate and remains legally unadopted.
In a recent Texas case of first impression,4 Heien v. Crabtree,5
the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed an inheritance claim based upon
a virtual adoption. Anna Heien was the heir of Rosa and Frank
Frei who, it was claimed, in about 1886, had taken custody of an in-
fant, later known as R. F. Frei, under an agreement to carry out a
statutory adoption. The child lived with the Freis for about twenty
years, during which time a normal parent-child relationship existed.
The Freis failed to carry out their agreement to adopt the child
during their lives. R. F. Frei, who never married, died intestate. The
plaintiff brought this suit to establish herself, through Rosa and
Frank Frei, as the heir of R. F. Frei, on the theory of a virtual adop-
tion. The petitioner in making the claim was contesting the escheat of
R. F. Frei's estate to the State of Texas. The county court and the
1Massachusetts is generally attributed with having introduced the first adop-
tion statute in 1851. See, Atkinson, Wills § 23 (2d ed 1953); 59 Yale L.J. 715 (1950);
but see Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 332, at 335 (1922). Adop-
tion was not authorized by statute in Great Britain until 1926. See 16 & 17 Geo. 5,
C. 29 (1926). The phenomenon of adoption was not foreign to most early-developed
civilizations, including the Romans, Hebrews, Babylonians, and Egyptians. Hock-
aday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906); Fairley, Inheritance Rights Conse-
quent to Adoption, 29 N.C.L. Rev. 227 (1951).
2Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize the doctrine and so deny any rights of
inheritance unless the adoption statute has been strictly complied with. E.g., Schultz
v. First Nat'l Bank, 22o Ore. 350, 348 P.2d 22 (1959); Clarkson v. Bliley, 185 Va.
82, 38 S.E.2d 22 (1946); St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 189
Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 921 (1926).
3See, e.g., Rumans v. Lighthizer, 363 Mo. 125, 249 S.W.2d 397 (1952); Moorman
v. Hunnicut, 325 S.V.2d 941 (Tex Civ. App. 1959).
fIn Moorman v. Hunnicutt, 325 S.W.2d 941 (Tex Civ. App. 1959), a case raising
the same issue as the principal case, writ was refused, N.R.E., to the Supreme Court
of Texas.
5369 S.W.2d 28 (rex. 1963).
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Court of Civil Appeals denied the claim,6 and the Supreme Court
of Texas affirmed in a 7 to 2 decision.
7
The majority of the Supreme Court of Texas rested its denial
of the petitioner's claim upon the prior holdings of the courts which
had determined that virtual adoptions do not create the legal status
of an adopted child.s Therefore, Anna Heien could not establish any
legal relationship between herself and R. F. Frei upon which the
claimed right of inheritance could be based. The court in the prin-
cipal case also qualified two sections of the Texas Probate Code, which
had provided a strong basis for the plaintiff's claim.9 Section 3 (b) of
the Texas Probate Code defines a child as follows:
"(b) 'Child' includes an adopted child, whether adopted by
an existing or former statutory procedure or by acts of estop-
pel, but, unless expressly so stated herein, does not include an
unrecognized, illegitimate child of the father."'1
Section 40 of the Probate Code treats an adopted child for the
purposes of inheritance as a natural child, born in wedlock to the
adoptive parents." The majority opinion in the principal case, in
affirming the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, disposed of the
statutory provisions of the Texas Probate Code by candidly stating
that the legislature in providing that a child could be fully adopted
by acts of estoppel,'2 had misconstrued the holding of the courts.18
The two dissenting judges in the principal case were of the opin-
ion that the words of the statute were unambiguous and therefore the
0364 S.V.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). The opinion of the Court of Civil Ap-
peals does not deal directly with the statutory provisions of the Texas Probate Code.
7369 S.V. 2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
8Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951); Jones v. Guy, 135
Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 9o6 (1940); Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
I'Tex. Prob. Code §§ 3(b), 40 (1956).
"'Tex. Prob. Code § 3 (b) (1956).
""For the purpose of inheritance under the laws of descent and distribution, an
adopted child shall be regarded as the child of the parent or parents by adoption
and their kin the same as if such child were the natural legitimate child of such
parent or parents by adoption, and such parent or parents by adoption and their
kin inheriting from and through such adopted child the same as if such child were
the natural legitimate child of such parent or parents by adoption .... Nothing
herein shall prevent any parents by adoption from disposing of his property by
will according to law. The presence of this Section specifically relating to the rights
of adopted children shall in no way diminish the rights of such children, under the
laws of descent and distribution or otherwise, which they acquire by virtue of
their inclusion in the definition of 'child' which is contained in this Code." Tex.
Prob. Code § 40 (1956).
'-See note io supra.
'2 See note 8 supra.
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property of the intestate should have been allowed to pass to the
petitioner rather than escheat to the State. Further, the dissenting
opinion regarded the law prior to the passage of the Probate Code as
inconsequential because it had been superseded by the statute.'
14
The doctrine of virtual adoption is also called de facto adoption,15
adoption by estoppel, 16 specific performance of a contract to adopt,17
and equitable adoption.'s In virtual adoptions which are established
by means of an estoppel, as in the principal case, the foster parents
are said to be estopped to deny that, due to their failure to carry out
the stipulations of the contract to adopt, a legally constituted adop-
tion has taken place. The equitable remedy was developed to alleviate
the effect of adoption statutes which were strictly construed because
they abrogated the common law and therefore resulted in foster
children being denied the right to inherit from their foster parents.
Virtual adoptions benefit only the foster child because they do
not form a permanent legal relationship. For this reason such adop-
tions are inapplicable for the purpose of inheriting from the foster
child through the virtual adoption. The equitable remedy does, how-
ever, create the status of an adopted child to the extent that it permits
unadopted foster children to inherit from their foster parents the
intestate share of a legally adopted child in accordance with the ap-
plicable state statute.19 While no jurisdiction has gone so far as to deem
"The Texas Probate Code was approved on April 4, 1955. Tex. Prob. Code
(1956).
"E.g., Schultz v. First Nat'l Bank, 22o Ore. 35o, 348 P.2d 22 (1959).
"Adoption by estoppel forecloses the foster parent or parents and their privies
from denying that a statutory adoption was consummated. A statutory adoption
does not arise from the application of the doctrine. The doctrine cannot be utilized
by the child to estop the heirs of the foster parents because they have failed in no
duty to the child. E.g., Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1967); Rubiolo v.
McNees, 3oi S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
17Specific performance of a contract to adopt is decreed only to the extent
that the child is permitted to inherit from his foster parents as if he were adopted
in compliance with the statute. E.g., Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So. 2d 417
(1943); Hollis v. Maxwell, 215 Ga. 483, 111 S.E.2d 72 (1959); Chambers v. Byers,
214 N.C. 373, 199 S.E. 398 (1938).
'The terms "equitable adoption," "de facto adoption," and "virtual adoption"
are used interchangeably with reference to adoption by estoppel and specific per-
formance of a contract to adopt. E.g., in Foster v. Cheek, 212 Ga. 821, 96 S.E.2d
545 (1957) the opinion uses the term equitable adoption when referring to specific
performance of a contract to adopt.
"The following state statutes define, either impliedly or expressly, the inherit-
ance rights of adopted children. There is a definite trend in the direction of grant-
ing adopted children the same rights of inheritance as those enjoyed by a natural
child born in wedlock.
Ala. Code tit. 27, § 5, 9 (1958)-
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 2o.1o.11o (Supp. 1962).
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Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-1o8 (1956).
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-109 (1947).
Cal. Prob. Code § 257.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-2-4 (195).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-65 (1958).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 920 (1953).
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-222 (1961).
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 72.22, 731.30 (1962).
Ga. Code Ann. § 74-404 (1935).
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 331-16 (1955).
Idaho Code Ann. §§ 16-1507, 15o8 (1948).
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-121 (1946).
Iowa Code Ann. § 6oo.6 (195o).
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-507 (1949).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.520 (1963).
La. Rev. Stat. §§ 9:421, 462 (195o).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 158, § 40 (1954).
Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 78 (1957).
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 210, §7 (1955)-
Mich. Comp. Laws § 710.9 (1948).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.29 (1948).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090 (1959).
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § .. 1-212 (1947).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-110, 111 (1943).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 127.16o (ig6i).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 461:6 (1955).
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 9:3-3o (1937)-
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-19 (1953).
N.Y. Doam. Rel. Laws § 115.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-23 (1962).
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-11-13, 14 (196o).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 107.13 (Baldwin 1963).
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§52, 53, 56 (1936).
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 111.210 (1953).
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1963).
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 15-7-16, 17 (1956).
S.C. Code § 19-52.1 (1952).
S.D. Code § 14.0407 (Supp. 1960).
Tenn. Code Ann § 36-126 (1955)-
Tex Prob. Code §§ 3, 40 (1956).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-10 (1953).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 448 (Supp. 1963).
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.32.14o (1951).
W. Va. Code Ann. § 4759 (1961).
Wis. Stat. § 48.92 (1959)-
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-721 (1957).
The Model Probate Code suggests the following statute: "For the purpose of
inheritance to, through and from a legally adopted child, such child shall be
treated the same as if he were the natural child of his adopting parents, and he
shall cease to be treated as the child of his natural parents for the purposes of in-
testate succession." Model Probate Code § 27 (Simes 1946).
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the equitably adopted child an adopted child per se, some courts
have conceded additional privileges belonging to legally adopted
children, to those virtually adopted.20
Courts presented with the question of whether a claim of inheri-
tance can be established through a virtual adoption need not resolve
that inquiry unless a virtual adoption has been established by the evi-
dence.21 Five elements are necessary to establish a virtual adoption:
(i) the foster parents must have died intestate; 22 (2) there must have
been a contract or agreement to adopt;23 (3) the foster parents rep-
resented to the child that he was adopted, thereby inducing him to
perform the duties expected of a child;24 (4) the child carried out his
filial obligations in the belief that he was an adopted child;25 and (5)
the foster parents have never undertaken any of the steps that lead to
a legal adoption or, if they did, the adoption was not perfected. 20
While there is no suggestion from either the unanimous opinion of
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas27 or from the opinion of the Su-
preme Court of Texas that the claimants expressly relied upon the pro-
'See, e.g., In re Radovich, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 9o8 P.2d 14 (1957) in which a child
not legally adopted was held to be entitled to an adopted child's inheritance tax
exemption.
2'E.g., Moorman v. Honnicut, 325 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) held that
there was insuffcient evidence of a contract to raise an estoppel where the heirs of
the foster parents had brought suit to establish their right to inherit from the foster
child.
-E.g., Tex. Prob. Code § 40 (1956) reads in part "Nothing shall prevent any
parent by adoption from disposing of his property by will according to law." See
note 15 supra.
23 ailey, Adoption "By Estoppel," 36 Texas L. Rev. 30 (1957) is an article
cited in the principal case in which the author demonstrates that the contract
is not only significant because it reflects the intentions of the foster parents to
adopt the child, but it also supplies a tenable basis for the child's reliance upon
the foster parents' representation that he has been or will be legally adopted so as
to raise an estoppel in favor of the child. Many jurisdictions allow parol con-
tracts or agreements to be the basis of the equitable remedy which they provide.
See, e.g., Hicks v. Simons, 271 F.2d 875 (0oth Cir. 1959); Monahan v. Monahan,
14 Ill. 2d 449, 153 N.E.2d 1 (1958); In re Firle's Estate, 197 Minn. 1, 265 N.W. 88
(1936); Calvert v. Johnston, 304 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Jones v. Guy,
135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 9o6 (1940).
24E.g., In Clevenger v. Clevenger, 1i Cal. Rptr. 707 (Dist. Ct. 1961) a husband
was not estopped to deny the legitimacy of his wife's child because he had not
represented to the child that he was his father.
2Hegger v. Kausler, 3o3 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1957); Barney v. Hutchinson, 25 N.M.
82, 177 Pac. 89o (1918).
"E.g., Monahan v. Monahan, 14 I1. 2d 449, 153 N.E.2d 1 (1958). In that case
the foster parents failed to accomplish an adoption because they erroneously be-
lieved that the consent of both natural parents was necessary, and they were un-
successful in attempting to locate the father of the child.2 See note 6 supra.
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visions of the Probate Code as a basis for their claim, the Supreme
Court appears to have been disposed to pass upon the provisions of the
statute because the case was one of first impression.2s The limitations
put on sections 3 (b) and 40 of the Texas Probate Code by the princi-
pal case appear to have been essential in order to retain the integrity
of the doctrine of virtual adoption in Texas.
In order to allow the heirs of the foster parents to inherit from
the foster child by acts of estoppel, it would be necessary to con-
ceive of a virtual adoption as creating an adoptive status equivalent
to that achieved by a statutory adoption. The doctrine was created,
however, only to give to the unadopted child the rights of inheritance
which would normally follow from a statutory adoption, but it was
not intended to act as a substitute for the statutory requirements.
Since the child, and not the heirs, has suffered as a result of the foster
parents' shortcomings in not complying wth their contract to adopt,
equity would be adverse to extending the principles of virtual adop-
tion to benefit parties other than the child.29 Therefore, if the court in
the principal case had followed the literal wording of the statute and
allowed an heir of Rosa and Frank Frei to inherit from R. F. Frei, it
would have laid down a precedent inconsistent with the equitable
principles from which the doctrine was derived, as well as dissonant
with the scheme of the laws of descent and distribution, which are
based upon the legal relationships existing at the time of an inte-
state's death.
Virtual adoptions appear to serve a useful purpose. The inten-
tion of the foster parents to include the unadopted child as an heir
may be safely implied from contracts and agreements to adopt. How-
ever, because the equitable remedy creates an exception to existing
adoption statutes, it should be used only to allow unadopted foster
children to inherit from their foster parents, and then only when there
is evidence sufficient to show the particular facts required to raise
an estoppel in favor of the unadopted child.
STANLEY P. ATwooD
%See note 4 supra.
OMcLemore v. Memphis & C.R.R., iii Tenn. 639, 69 S.W. 338, 344 (1902). In
that case the court said in discussing the use of estoppel affirmatively by a party him-
self estopped. "Estoppel can never be invoked to establish facts, but may only
be used to prevent parties from relying upon facts which do exist."
